Latest action: Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.
Bill is filed in its originating chamber and assigned a number.
Sponsor
Beth Van Duyne (R-TX)
Filed in the House.
Next: In Committee
Members of the committee(s) the bill was referred to
Authorizes recovery of fraudulent COVID unemployment benefits deposited in bank accounts.
The problem
During the pandemic, fraudsters obtained unemployment benefits they weren't entitled to. Money ended up in bank accounts across the country. Recovering these funds has been difficult and slow.
The proposal
The bill gives authorities power to locate and recover COVID unemployment fraud money held in banks. Banks would be required to help identify and return fraudulently obtained funds to the government.
The impact
Banks must assist in finding fraud money. Fraudsters may lose stolen benefits. Taxpayers recover misused funds. Some account holders face freezes or delays if wrongly flagged.
COVID unemployment fraud cost billions in taxpayer dollars. Recovering these funds reduces the public loss. It makes the program more financially sustainable for future emergencies.
Serious enforcement efforts discourage criminals from attempting similar schemes. Clear consequences make fraud riskier. This protects other federal assistance programs.
People who illegally obtained benefits face real consequences. Justice is served when wrongdoing is punished. This maintains program integrity.
Banks already have account information and fraud detection systems. Using their resources accelerates recovery compared to slower government-only efforts.
Banks must share account information with authorities. Innocent people's financial privacy may be exposed. People worry about government access to personal banking data.
Innocent people could have accounts frozen if incorrectly identified. Legitimate funds could be delayed or seized by mistake. Recovery and appeals processes may be slow and stressful.
The bill may not clearly define how much responsibility banks have. Banks might face conflicting legal obligations or lawsuits. This creates uncertainty for financial institutions.
Fraudsters often transfer money to other accounts or spend it quickly. Funds sitting in original accounts represent only part of total fraud. Many recovered funds may already be gone.
Generated by AI from the bill text. Not a prediction and not legal or policy advice. The percentage is the model's own rating of each item — self-reported, and not a measure of how accurate it is.
Loading map…
Loading...
0 citizens have already voted
Free · No spam · See how your representatives voted
Be the first to weigh in
Your vote starts the conversation
How citizen engagement works
Citizens vote & comment
Public opinion data is aggregated and updated in real time.
Patterns become visible
Representatives can see constituent sentiment broken down by district.
Your voice on the record
Contact your rep directly — one constituent call can shift a staffer's priority list.
Research shows that constituent contacts — especially calls — are among the most effective ways to influence a legislator's position on active bills.
Other bills in this policy area
S 5639
Portal for Appraisal Licensing Act of 2026
S 1564
Floodplain Enhancement and Recovery Act
HR 1190
Expanding Access to Capital for Rural Job Creators Act
HR 10167
Common Cents Act
Individual contributions, grouped by employer · FEC
Where their individual donors work · 2026 cycle
Money from people who work there, not from the company. Not tied to this bill.
Itemized individual contributions via FEC, grouped by the employer each contributor self-reported. Companies and unions cannot contribute to federal candidates from their treasuries, so these totals are money from people who work at an employer — never from the organization itself. They are campaign contributions covering a full election cycle and are not connected to this bill.
Senate LDA lobbying disclosures
Couldn't load lobbying disclosures right now.