Latest action: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
Referred to one or more standing committees for review, hearings, and possible markup.
Specific committees not parsed from action data.
The committee may hold hearings, amend the bill, or let it die without action.
Next: Reported
Full chamber floor — Speaker / Majority Leader controls scheduling
Bans Chinese optical transceivers from U.S. national security computer systems.
The problem
Chinese-made optical transceivers in U.S. government networks may pose security risks through espionage, surveillance, or system vulnerabilities exploited by foreign adversaries.
The proposal
Prohibits procurement and use of Chinese optical transceivers in federal national security systems; likely requires replacement of existing equipment with approved alternatives.
The impact
Federal agencies must replace equipment, increasing costs. Technology companies selling to government face new compliance requirements. U.S. technology manufacturers gain market advantage.
Removing Chinese components from sensitive networks decreases potential backdoors for surveillance or data theft. Protects classified information and military communications from compromise.
U.S. optical transceiver manufacturers gain guaranteed federal contracts. Creates jobs in American technology and manufacturing sectors.
Reduces government dependence on potentially adversarial nations for critical infrastructure components. Builds more resilient domestic sourcing capabilities.
Federal agencies must purchase expensive American-made equipment to replace existing systems. Diverts funding from other national security priorities and increases taxpayer burden.
Restricting to domestic suppliers may reduce price competition and slow technological advancement. Could incentivize less efficient monopolistic practices.
China may impose tariffs or restrictions on U.S. companies doing business there. Could escalate tech sector tensions and harm American exports.
Identifying and replacing all affected components across vast federal systems requires extensive coordination and time. May create temporary security gaps during transition.
Generated by AI from the bill text. Not a prediction and not legal or policy advice. The percentage is the model's own rating of each item — self-reported, and not a measure of how accurate it is.
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Individual contributions, grouped by employer · FEC
Where their individual donors work · 2026 cycle
Money from people who work there, not from the company. Not tied to this bill.
Itemized individual contributions via FEC, grouped by the employer each contributor self-reported. Companies and unions cannot contribute to federal candidates from their treasuries, so these totals are money from people who work at an employer — never from the organization itself. They are campaign contributions covering a full election cycle and are not connected to this bill.
Senate LDA lobbying disclosures
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